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Leaving “Sex” Out of It: Amending the
Federal Arbitration Act to Ensure
Bostock’s Victory for LGBTQ Employee
Rights
Sheya Rivard*
INTRODUCTION

After reading the news that the Supreme Court had ruled in
his favor, Gerald Bostock screamed and hugged his partner Andy:
“The long, seven-year journey I’ve had, it’s well worth every ache
and pain. I didn’t ask for this, but it needed to be done.”1 Like Gerald Bostock, other LGBTQ2 employees from across the nation described being overcome with “sheer joy,” “optimism,” “relief,” and a
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1. Samantha Schmidt, Fired after joining a gay softball league, Gerald
Bostock wins landmark Supreme Court case, SEATTLE TIMES (June 15, 2020,
3:02 PM), https://www.seattletimes.com/nation-world/fired-after-joining-agay-softball-league-gerald-bostock-wins-landmark-supreme-court-case/
[https://perma.cc/RB73-QQ9E].
2. This comment will use the acronym “LGBTQ” for lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer. For the purposes of this comment, the acronym is
intended to encompass all sexual orientations and gender identities. Glossary
of Terms, HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN, https://www.hrc.org/resources/glossary-ofterms [https://perma.cc/P6CA-3VAW] (last visited Mar. 3, 2021).
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sense of long-overdue “validation”3 upon seeing the Court’s decision
in Bostock v. Clayton County, Georgia on June 15, 2020.4 Prior to
Bostock, approximately half of the country’s estimated 8.1 million
LGBTQ employees lived in states where they were not protected by
local workplace discrimination laws, and in some states could be
fired outright for their LGBTQ status.5 The Bostock decision ensured protections for all LGBTQ employees in holding that federal
law,6 which prohibits discrimination “on the basis of sex,”7 includes
people who claim discrimination based on their gender identity or
sexual orientation.8 Understandably, Bostock was seen as a hardfought victory for LGBTQ employee rights and well worth celebrating.
However, a dark cloud looms over the ability of LGBTQ employees to fully exercise their rights under Bostock: mandatory arbitration agreements (MAAs). An MAA in the employment contract
of an LGBTQ employee could contain the common provision that all
disputes arising out of or related to the employment shall be subject
to arbitration.9 The use of MAAs in employment contracts is widespread and has become increasingly prevalent over the last thirty
years10 because of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) and the Supreme Court’s broad interpretation of the FAA as favoring the enforceability of MAAs.11 Therefore, even though LGBTQ employees

3. See Amber Jamieson & Julia Reinstein, The Supreme Court’s LGBTQ
Decision Will Have Huge Impacts for Those in States with no Prior Protections,
BUZZFEED (June 15, 2020, 6:50 PM), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/
article/juliareinstein/supreme-court-lgbtq-gay-transgender-lesbian-decision?bfsource=relatedmanual [https://perma.cc/E9MY-U7EK].
4. See generally Bostock v. Clayton County, Ga., 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020).
5. See Dawn Ennis, Analysis Shows Most States Lack Legal Protections
for LGBTQ Workers, FORBES (Oct. 25, 2019, 7:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/
sites/dawnstaceyennis/2019/10/25/analysis-shows-most-states-lack-legal-protections-for-lgbtq-workers/?sh=3af4ad2d2d07 [https://perma.cc/2KFY-95JB].
6. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
7. Id.
8. See Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1754.
9. See KATHERINE V.W. STONE & ALEXANDER J.S. COLVIN, ECON. POL’Y
INST., THE ARBITRATION EPIDEMIC 3 (2015).
10. See Jared Odessky, LGBTQ+ Workers Are Winning Their Rights. But
Because of Their Forced Arbitration, They Can’t Use Them., NAT’L EMP’T L.
PROJECT (June 15, 2018), https://www.nelp.org/blog/LGBTQ+-workerswinning-rights-forced-arbitration-cant-use/ [https://perma.cc/Y6XX-P6KZ].
11. See infra Part I.C.
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have federal workplace protections from sex discrimination after
Bostock, with an MAA in place an LGBTQ employee’s only feasible
avenue to bring a workplace sex discrimination claim is arbitration.
LGBTQ employees generally do not have the ability to turn down a
job because of an MAA, as LGBTQ employees often wield much less
negotiating and bargaining power than the average employee due
their increased likelihood to endure unemployment, poverty, homelessness, and other socioeconomic hardships.12 Additionally, the
lack of diversity in the arbitration profession deters LGBTQ employees from pursuing discrimination claims and/or fully engaging
in private, closed-door arbitration, as is required under MAAs.13
These issues faced by LGBTQ employees are exacerbated in the arbitration process through various ways, which typically favor the
employer, such as removing an employee’s right to a jury trial, insufficient discovery to make a viable claim, and the employer’s
choosing of the arbitrator.14
MAAs not only give employers the upper hand by eradicating
the ability of LGBTQ employees to litigate sex discrimination
claims, but they also threaten to undercut the Bostock victory for
LGBTQ workplace protections altogether. As such, the FAA should
be amended to exempt sex discrimination claims from MAAs because mandatory arbitration provides advantages to the employer
to the detriment of employees, and LGBTQ employees—specifically
transgender employees—experience significant socioeconomic disadvantages that other vulnerable employees do not.15 Further, after previous failed attempts,16 current social movements and political support for victims of sex discrimination create a unique timing
opportunity to limit the FAA’s expansive power through an amendment that is narrow in scope.17

12. LGBT Data & Demographics, WILLIAMS INST., https://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/visualization/lgbt-stats/?topic=LGBT#density
[https://perma.cc/GP9Y-74S9] (last visited Mar. 7, 2021).
13. See infra Part II.B.
14. Devon M. Loerch, The Man Behind the Curtain: How Mandatory Arbitration Impedes the Advancement of LGBTQ+ Rights, 2020 J. DISP. RESOL. 151,
166 (2020).
15. Id.
16. See infra Part III.
17. Id.
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Part I of this comment provides background on the protections
granted to LGBTQ employees through the Bostock case, MAAs in
the employment context, and the effects of the FAA and its interpretation by the Supreme Court regarding binding arbitration
agreements in the American workplace. Part II discusses the
unique socioeconomic challenges LGBTQ employees face and the
ways in which mandatory arbitration provides advantages to the
employer, which hurt the employee and do not promote the policy
goals of anti-discrimination legislation. Part III provides a solution
for how LGBTQ employees can address the far reach of mandatory
arbitration and fully exercise their Bostock rights by capitalizing on
current political support and social movements to push for federal
legislation amending the FAA to exempt sex discrimination claims
from MAAs.
I.

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BOSTOCK, MANDATORY ARBITRATION,
AND THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT

A. Bostock and LGBTQ Rights
The Bostock decision was rendered in a trio of cases, all of
which, an employer fired a long-time employee shortly after the employee revealed that he or she was homosexual or transgender.18
The employees in each of these cases brought suit under Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act alleging unlawful discrimination on the basis
of sex.19 However, given that the Supreme Court had never considered the issue of whether discrimination based on sex under Title
VII encompassed gay and transgender employees, the circuits that
decided the three Bostock cases were at odds in their holdings.20
The Supreme Court settled the circuit split in Bostock.21 Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act states that an employer is prohibited
from, “refus[ing] to hire or . . . discharg[ing] any individual, or otherwise . . . discriminat[ing] against any individual with respect to
his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national

18.
19.
20.
21.

Bostock v. Clayton County, Georgia, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1737 (2020).
See id.; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1738; Loerch, supra note 14, at 156.
See Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1737.
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origin.”22 Justice Gorsuch, writing for the majority and employing
a textualist mode of statutory interpretation, reasoned that employment decisions based on sexual orientation or gender identity necessarily involve reference to sex: “If the employer fires the male employee for no reason other than the fact he is attracted to men, the
employer discriminates against him for traits or actions it tolerates
in his female colleague.”23 Similarly, he reasoned that discrimination against transgender employees was discrimination on the basis
of sex. For example, discharging a transgender female employee
and retaining “an otherwise identical employee who was identified
as female at birth” is penalizing “a person identified as male at
birth for traits or actions that it tolerates in an employee identified
as female at birth.”24 Accordingly, the Supreme Court concluded
that discrimination because of an employee’s gay or transgender
status is discrimination on the basis of sex, and as such, gay and
transgender employees are protected from sex discrimination under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.25
Prior to Bostock, LGBTQ employees only had a patchwork of
workplace protections varying from state to state, with thirty-three
states providing some degree of protection for LGBTQ employees.26
After Bostock, in every state, federal protections apply to LGBTQ
employees, giving LGBTQ employees the ability to bring a Title VII
claim against their employer for sex discrimination.27 While Bostock will have a tremendous impact on LBGTQ employees, the pervasive use of forced/mandatory arbitration agreements in employment contracts threatens to limit the rights won by LGBTQ
employees under Bostock.28

22. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
23. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1741.
24. Id.
25. See id. at 1737.
26. Loerch, supra note 14, at 156–58; see Adam Liptak, Civil Rights Law
Protects Gay and Transgender Workers, Supreme Court Rules, N.Y. TIMES
(June 15, 2020, 10:44 AM), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/15/us/gaytransgender-workers-supreme-court.html?searchResultPosition=1
[https://perma.cc/8SCA-N3E3].
27. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a); see Bostock, 140 S. Ct. 1731 at 1754; see also
Loerch, supra note 14, at 156–58.
28. See Bostock, 140 S. Ct. 1731 at 1754; see also Loerch, supra note 14, at
163.
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B. The Operation and Pervasiveness of MAAs
Before exploring the federal statute that upholds the use of
MAAs in the employment context, it is important to understand
what mandatory arbitration entails and just how prevalent these
agreements have become in the employment context.29 Generally,
employers use arbitration agreements in employment contracts to
control the dispute resolution forum by restricting an employee’s
ability to sue the employer in court. This is because when employees agree to binding arbitration agreements, they give up their ability to pursue any future claims in court arising from employment
disputes, often termed predispute arbitration agreements.30 Further, such agreements frequently contain clauses requiring employees to waive their right to a jury trial and class action suits.31 Importantly, MAAs are often required as a condition of hire and if a
potential employee does not sign the agreement, he or she does not
get the job.32
If an employment contract contains an MAA, all claims against
the employer must be dealt with through arbitration, which is an
informal proceeding wherein, unless otherwise specified in the
agreement, normal rules of evidence and civil procedure do not apply.33 In the context of employment contracts, the employer, as the
creator of the MAA, is generally the one who designs and determines the terms of arbitration.34 Typically, the parties designate
an arbitrator who hears the parties’ arguments, witnesses

29. See Loerch, supra note 14, at 165; ALEXANDER J.S. COLVIN, ECON. POL’Y
INST., THE GROWING USE OF MANDATORY ARBITRATION 5 (2017); Kathleen
McCullough, Mandatory Arbitration and Sexual Harassment Claims: #MeTooand Times up-Inspired Action Against the Federal Arbitration Act, 87 FORDHAM
L. REV. 2653, 2657 (2019).
30. COLVIN, supra note 29, at 1.
31. Vail Kohnert-Yount, Jared Odessky, & Sejal Singh, No, Companies
That Force Workers to Sign Away Their Right to Sue Are Not LGBTQ-Friendly,
SLATE (Jan. 23, 2019, 4:26 PM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2019/01/human-rights-campaign-corporate-equality-index-arbitrationlgbtq.html [https://perma.cc/V8ML-4UVB].
32. IMRE S. SZALAI, EMP. RTS. ADVOC. INST. FOR L. & POL’Y, THE
WIDESPREAD USE OF WORKPLACE ARBITRATION AMONG AMERICA’S TOP 100
COMPANIES 8 (2018).
33. STONE & COLVIN, supra note 9, at 5.
34. See id. (“The employee…has no real choice or ability to negotiate the
terms of the arbitration clause.”).
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testimony, and reviews evidence submitted by the parties.35 After
the hearing, the arbitrator issues a binding award that leaves “no
realistic possibility for appeal.”36
Employers’ use of MAAs in employment contracts has grown
increasingly prevalent over the last thirty years.37 Today, it is estimated that over fifty percent of Fortune 100 companies require
their employees to sign MAAs in regard to any employment dispute,
and smaller entities have followed suit.38 As of 2017, 50.4% of nonunion, private-sector employers have MAAs in place for resolution
of disputes with employees.39 Among companies with 1,000 or more
employees, 65.1% have mandatory arbitration procedures.40 Even
if MAAs are not signed upon hire, employers can and do require
current employees to agree to amendments to their existing contracts or to sign separate MAAs.41 MAAs have taken hold of employment contracts in the American workforce and it is estimated
that over half of all employment disputes in the last decade have
been mandatorily arbitrated.42 All this to say, MAAs have an enormous influence in the employment context, as “over half of the
American workforce has signed away their ability to vindicate their
rights in court.”43
C. A Strong Foundation for MAA Enforceability—the FAA and its
Interpretation by the Supreme Courtmnk
Congress enacted the FAA44 in 1925 and intended for the legislation to reach only parties with similar bargaining power who
voluntarily agreed to arbitrate, and as such, was largely applied to
commerce transactions.45 Following its enactment, however,
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. See Odessky, supra note 10.
38. SZALAI, supra note 32, at 11.
39. COLVIN, supra note 29, at 4–5.
40. Id. at 5.
41. Loerch, supra note 14, at 166.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 165.
44. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–15.
45. See Loerch, supra note 14, at 163; Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just?, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1631, 1636 (2005) (discussing
the passage of the FAA in 1925, “[T]he use of arbitration was [intended to be]
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American businesses broadly embraced arbitration as a cheaper,
more efficient method of resolving disputes as compared to civil litigation, so that today it has, “[infiltrated] the realm of the private
citizen.”46 While the language of the FAA is fairly brief,47 the Supreme Court has interpreted it expansively, rendering decisions
that have enforced MAAs in the employment context, limited an
employee’s ability to challenge them, and preempted the ability of
states to regulate MAAs.48 Through the Court’s broad interpretation of the FAA, and by operation of the Supremacy Clause of the
Constitution,49 MAAs in employment contracts are now binding on
millions of American employees, preventing them from seeking justice through civil litigation.50
Initially, Title VII claims enjoyed protection from the FAA’s
reach in compelling arbitration. Decided in 1974, Alexander v.
Gardner-Denver Co. was one of the first and most significant cases
regarding MAAs and statutory claims in the employment context.51
In Alexander, a drill operator whose union contract contained an
arbitration clause attempted to bring a race discrimination claim in
limited to business-to-business or management/union contexts…when one
Senator voiced a concern that arbitration contracts might be ‘offered on a takeit-or-leave-it basis to captive customers or employees,’ the Senator was reassured by the bill’s supporters that they did not intend for the bill to cover such
situations.”).
46. Michael L. Rustad et al., An Empirical Study of Predispute Mandatory
Arbitration Clauses in Social Media Terms of Service Agreements, 34 U. ARK.
LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 643, 676 (2012).
47. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (“[a] written provision in any maritime transaction or a
contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration
a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to
submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a contract,
transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”).
48. See Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1,
24–25, (1983) (“Section 2 [of the FAA] is a congressional declaration of a liberal
federal policy favoring arbitration agreements . . . . The Arbitration Act establishes that, as a matter of federal law, any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration.”); Southland Corp. v.
Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10–11 (1984); Mitsubishi Motors v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614, 640 (1985); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500
U.S. 20, 26–27 (1991).
49. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
50. STONE & COLVIN, supra note 9, at 3–4.
51. See generally Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
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district court, even though the issue had already been decided adversely against the employee in arbitration.52 The lower court
granted the employer’s summary judgement motion, in which the
employer argued that the race discrimination claim had already
been decided by the arbitrator and as such, the employee was not
then able to bring the claim in court.53 The case made its way up
to the Supreme Court which held that, at least in regard to arbitration conducted under the union’s collective bargaining agreement,
an employee could bring a discrimination claim in court, even if he
or she had already lost on that claim in arbitration.54 The Court
reasoned that because the labor arbitrators in Alexander only had
authority to decide contractual rights and not individual statutory
rights,55 that Congress intended for the “final responsibility for enforcement of Title VII [to be] vested with federal courts.”56 Further,
Title VII’s policy goal of preventing and remedying discrimination
in the workplace would be best served by allowing “an employee to
pursue fully both his remedy under the . . . arbitration clause” and
in the courts.57 After Alexander, all indications pointed to statutory
claims, like Title VII claims, being exempt from MAAs in employee
contracts.58
Then, in 1991, the Supreme Court in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp. effectively erased this exemption.59 In
Gilmer, the Supreme Court held that the FAA controlled and compelled arbitration in a dispute in which an employee sued his employer in court for age discrimination under the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act (ADEA).60 In a seeming about-face from Alexander, the Court concluded that mandatory arbitration in employment disputes involving an alleged violation of federal anti-discrimination statutes was not inconsistent with the “framework and
52. Id. at 43.
53. Id.
54. See id. at 59–60.
55. See id. at 53–54.
56. Id. at 44.
57. Id. at 59–60; Taylor J. Freeman Peshehonoff, Title VII’s Deficiencies
Affect #MeToo: A Look at Three Ways Title VII Continues to Fail America’s
Workforce, 72 OKLA. L. REV. 479, 510 (2020).
58. Freeman Peshehonoff, supra note 57, at 511.
59. See McCullough, supra note 29, at 2666.
60. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991).
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purposes” of the statutes.61 The Court distinguished Alexander in
several ways,62 but notably by pointing out that the outcome of Alexander turned on the employee’s rights under the particular terms
of his union’s collective bargaining agreement, but in Gilmer, no
such union collective bargaining agreement was present.63 Further, in addressing the policy concerns of statutory claims laid out
in Alexander64 the Court in Gilmer reasoned that, an agreement to
arbitrate a statutory claim, such as an ADEA claim, is “not a waiver
of substantive rights, but merely an agreement to resolve claims
arising from those rights in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum”65 and “so long as the prospective litigant effectively may vindicate [his or her] statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum,
the statute will continue to serve both its remedial and deterrent
function.”66 The Court in Gilmer also explained that, given the relatively infrequent use of arbitration agreements in the workplace
at the time, “it [was] unlikely that all or even most ADEA claimants
[would] be subject to arbitration agreements.”67 After Gilmer,

61. Id. at 27.
62. Id. at 35. The Supreme Court noted the differences between Gilmer
and Alexander when it stated:
There are several important distinctions between the Gardner-Denver
line of cases and the case before us. First, those cases did not involve
the issue of the enforceability of an agreement to arbitrate statutory
claims. Rather, they involved the quite different issue whether arbitration of contract-based claims precluded subsequent judicial resolution of statutory claims. Since the employees there had not agreed to
arbitrate their statutory claims, and the labor arbitrators were not
authorized to resolve such claims, the arbitration in those cases understandably was held not to preclude subsequent statutory actions.
Second, because the arbitration in those cases occurred in the context
of a collective bargaining agreement, the claimants there were represented by their unions in the arbitration proceedings.
Id.
63. Id. (“An important concern therefore was the tension between collective representation and individual statutory rights, a concern not applicable to
the present case.”).
64. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 59–60 (1974).
65. Marsha Levinson, Mandatory Arbitration: How the Current System
Perpetuates Sexual Harassment Cultures in the Workplace, 59 SANTA CLARA L.
REV. 485, 498 (2020) (quoting Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26).
66. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 28 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637 (1985)).
67. Id. at 32.
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lower courts began compelling arbitration in cases involving alleged
employer violations of federal anti-discrimination statutes.68 Encouraged by the Supreme Court’s decision in Gilmer, the percentage
of American workers forced to sign employment contracts with
MAAs grew from under three percent in 1992 to nearly twenty-five
percent in the early 2000s.69
In holding that the FAA manifests a “liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements”70 which preempts conflicting state
statutes, Gilmer also paved the way for later cases that build on
this precedent and strengthen the force of the FAA.71 Following
Gilmer, the Supreme Court explicitly ruled in Circuit City v. Adams
that the FAA applied to MAAs in employment contracts.72 In 2011,
the Supreme Court strengthened the FAA’s power to preempt state
laws regarding arbitration provisions in contracts in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion.73 In Concepcion, the Court held that the
FAA preempted a California law and state court ruling that attempted to apply the contract defense of unconscionability to a class
action waiver in an arbitration agreement.74 The Court held that
the state law was invalid because it “interfered with the fundamental attributes of arbitration.”75 In writing for the majority, Justice
Scalia affirmed that, “[s]tates cannot require a procedure that is
inconsistent with the FAA.”76
More recently, in 2018, the Supreme Court in Epic Sys. Corp.
v. Lewis continued to expand the scope of the FAA, holding that
because the FAA requires arbitration agreements to be enforced according to their terms, a class action waiver included in an MAA
precluded employees from seeking judicial relief as a generally
68. See, e.g., Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 939 F.2d 229, 230 (5th
Cir. 1991); Williams v. Katten, Muchin & Zavis, 837 F. Supp. 1430, 1443 (N.D.
Ill. 1993).
69. Odessky, supra note 10.
70. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 25 (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury
Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)).
71. Id. at 24–25; Levinson, supra note 65, at 498.
72. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 119 (2001).
73. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 343 (2011).
74. Id. at 352.
75. Id. at 344 (“The overarching purpose of the FAA…is to ensure the enforcement of arbitration agreements according to their terms so as to facilitate
streamlined proceedings.”).
76. Id. at 351.
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applicable contract defense did not apply.77 In concert with cases
like Concepcion, the Court in Epic Systems gave the go-ahead for
employers to use class action waivers in MAAs, furthering the FAA
onslaught on employee rights by diminishing employees’ ability to
band together to protect their rights.78
In short, because of the expansive interpretation of the FAA by
the Supreme Court, even with post-Bostock Title VII protections,
an LGBTQ employee who has signed an MAA with their employer
may never get to fully vindicate their rights by having “their day in
court.” As such, federal legislative action is needed on the FAA to
ensure that Bostock is not a hollow victory.
II. MANDATORY ARBITRATION PROVIDES ADVANTAGES FOR THE
EMPLOYER TO THE DETRIMENT OF THE VULNERABLE EMPLOYEES TITLE
VII IS INTENDED TO PROTECT

Arbitration is not without its benefits, and proponents of mandatory arbitration clauses argue that these provisions result in
more cost-efficient and expeditious resolution of employment disputes than civil litigation.79 Civil litigation is an arduous process
that is often delayed by overloaded dockets, protracted discovery,

77. See Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1624–1625 (2018). The
Court rejected employees’ argument that the class action waivers at issue were
illegal and thus unenforceable under the FAA as they violated employee rights
under the National Labor Relations Act. See id. The Court reasoned that the
class action waivers were not illegal under the NLRA and were therefore enforceable because “[The NLRA] does not express approval or disapproval of arbitration. It does not mention class or collective action procedures. It does not
even hint at a wish to displace the Arbitration Act—let alone accomplish that
much clearly and manifestly, as our precedents demand.” Id. at 1264.
78. See id. at 1633, 1640, 1646 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“The Court today
subordinates employee-protective labor legislation to the Arbitration Act. In so
doing, the Court . . . ignores the destructive consequences of diminishing the
right of employees to band together in confronting an employer. . . . Forced to
face their employers without company, employees ordinarily are no match for
the enterprise that hires them. Employees gain strength, however, if they can
deal with their employers in numbers . . . . The inevitable result of today’s
decision will be the underenforcement of federal and state statutes designed to
advance the well-being of vulnerable workers.”); see also Odessky, supra note
10.
79. See Charles B. Craver, The Use of Non-Judicial Procedures to Resolve
Employment Discrimination Claims, 11 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 141, 158 (2001);
see also Brian Farkas, The Continuing Voice of Dissent: Justice Thomas and
the Federal Arbitration Act, 22 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 33, 37 (2016).
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sophisticated rules of evidence and procedure, and time-intensive
jury trials.80 Proponents of arbitration argue that the speed and
informality of arbitration as opposed to litigation decreases the cost
to parties.81 Additionally, parties may prefer arbitration over litigation because arbitration is more private, as hearings do not take
place in an open courtroom and are not open to the public.82 Therefore, the privacy provided by arbitration allows both employers and
employees to keep damaging, sensitive, or valuable information out
of the public eye.83
However, the employer is the primary beneficiary of these advantages, especially when arbitration is used as the exclusive forum
for anti-discrimination claims brought by vulnerable parties with
relatively little bargaining power, such as LGBTQ employees.84 Because of the advantages the employer receives through mandatory
arbitration of discrimination claims, and the fact that LGBTQ employees experience unique and significant socioeconomic disadvantages in employment, in order to allow LGBTQ employees to
fully vindicate their rights won under Bostock, the FAA should be
amended to exempt sex discrimination claims from mandatory arbitration.
A. LGBTQ Employees Already Face Significant Disadvantages in
the Employment Context, Calling into Question the Balance of
Power and Voluntariness of MAAs
Currently, nearly sixteen percent of Generation Z, individuals
aged eighteen to twenty-three in 2020, identifies as LGBTQ.85 This
means that more of the American population, and current or potential members of the workforce, identify as LGBTQ than ever

80. See Farkas, supra note 79, at 37.
81. See Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 345.
82. See Amy J. Schmitz, Untangling the Privacy Paradox in Arbitration,
54 U. KAN. L. REV. 1211, 1211 (2006).
83. See generally id. at 1223–25 (discussing merchant groups’ and other
organizations’ preference for arbitration to keep matters private and tailored
to a specific industry).
84. See infra Part II.A.
85. Jeffrey M. Jones, LGBT Identification Rises to 5.6% in Latest U.S. Estimate, GALLUP (Feb. 24, 2021), https://news.gallup.com/poll/329708/lgbt-identification-rises-latest-estimate.aspx [https://perma.cc/PH4T-5MMW].
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before.86 However, LGBTQ employees, especially transgender employees, experience discrimination in the workplace at a startlingly
high rate.87 A 2014 study estimated that between eight and seventeen percent of lesbian, gay, and bisexual workers were denied employment or unfairly fired on the basis of their sexual orientation.88
For transgender employees, that number is even higher. The National Center for Transgender Equality (NCTE) estimates that
more than one in four transgender people have lost a job due to bias,
and more than three-fourths have experienced some form of workplace discrimination.89 Gillian Branstetter, a spokesperson for the
NCTE, said this workplace discrimination has a ripple effect that
“contributes to a crisis of homelessness, poverty and violence faced
by too many in our community.”90 Further, the LGBTQ community
as a whole experiences unemployment, poverty, food insecurity, and
homelessness at higher rates than the national average.91 Because
of these socioeconomic factors, LGBTQ employees have even less
negotiating power than the average employee when it comes to
turning down a job or refusing to sign an MAA, and brings into

86. Id. This study also found that 9.1% of Millennials (born 1981–1996)
identify as LGBTQ, 3.8% of Generation X (born 1965–1980), 2% of Baby Boomers (born 1946–1964), and only 1.3% of Traditionalists (born before 1946).
87. See Sharita Gruberg, Beyond Bostock: The Future for LGBTQ Rights,
CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS 1, 2 (Aug. 26, 2020, 9:01 AM), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/lgbtq-rights/reports/2020/08/26/489772/beyond-bostock-future-lgbtq-civil-rights/ [https://perma.cc/U989-JXEB].
88. Id.
89. Issues | Employment, NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUAL.,
https://transequality.org/issues/employment [https://perma.cc/4ABF-VTSH]
(last visited Feb. 28, 2021).
90. Julie Moreau, ‘Laughed out of interviews’: Trans workers discuss job
discrimination, NBC NEWS (Oct. 6, 2019, 2:22 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/
feature/nbc-out/laughed-out-interviews-trans-workers-discuss-job-discrimination-n1063041 [https://perma.cc/EE9C-WEWM].
91. LGBT Data & Demographics, WILLIAMS INST., https://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/visualization/lgbt-stats/?topic=LGBT#density
[https://perma.cc/V7LQ-BM7H] (last visited Sep. 9, 2021). The COVID-19 pandemic exacerbated these numbers to reveal more disparity in healthcare coverage and poverty levels. See Elliott Kozuch, HRC Releases Research Brief on
the Vulnerabilities of the LGBTQ Community During the COVID-19 Crisis,
HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN (Mar. 20, 2020), https://www.hrc.org/news/hrc-releasesresearch-brief-on-lgbtq-community-during-covid-19-crisis
[https://perma.cc/3GY9-RTJ3].
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question just how voluntarily employees enter into these agreements.92
Further, due to the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the FAA,
and the practical restrictions of administrative agencies, LGBTQ
employees have extremely limited options to address disadvantages
due to poverty or power imbalances once they have signed an MAA.
For example, if an LGBTQ employee experiencing poverty wanted
to bring a class action with other employees against an employer
for alleged sex discrimination, the Supreme Court has effectively
taken away this cost-sharing option for employees, as class action
waivers are enforceable in mandatory arbitration clauses.93 Bringing a discrimination claim through the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) is also a way an LGBTQ employee with
few resources could navigate around an MAA and save significant
monetary costs.94 Ideally, the EEOC, which can and does litigate
discrimination claims on behalf of some employees, would serve as
a cost-effective option for LGBTQ employees.95 The Court in
Gilmer even responded to critiques of mandatory arbitration by
pointing to the EEOC as a viable option for an employee wanting to
pursue a discrimination claim through litigation.96 However, the
EEOC like many other government agencies, is “overburdened and
underfunded.”97
Consequently, most employees who file a

92. See Loerch, supra note 14, at 167 (“A ruling recently handed down by
the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) has also allowed employers to rescind job offers or terminate an existing job if an individual fails to accept the
terms laid out in an employment contract.”).
93. Id. at 168.
94. See Filing a Charge of Discrimination, EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY
COMM’N, https://www.eeoc.gov/filing-charge-discrimination [perma.cc/US2GSK2Z] (last visited Sep. 8, 2021).
95. See Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S.
279, 297–98 (2002) (holding that the EEOC was not prohibited from pursuing
discrimination claim even though employee signed an arbitration agreement
as the FAA does not mention enforcement by public agencies or place restrictions on a nonparty to the agreement’s choice to pursue a claim).
96. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 28 (1991) (“We
also are unpersuaded by the argument that arbitration will undermine the role
of the EEOC in enforcing the ADEA. An individual ADEA claimant subject to
an arbitration agreement will still be free to file a charge with the EEOC, even
though the claimant is not able to institute a private judicial action.”).
97. Meagan Glynn, Note, #TimesUp for Confidential Employment Arbitration of Sexual Harassment Claims, 88 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1042, 1055 (2020);
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discrimination claim with the EEOC do not receive representation
or resolution through the EEOC.98 Due to socioeconomic factors,
many LGBTQ employees have little to no negotiating power when
it comes to refusing a job because of an MAA, and other methods
such as class actions or EEOC resolution are not always viable options. As such, the FAA needs to be amended to ensure that LGBTQ
employees can enforce their rights, without being forced into arbitration.
B. Mandatory Arbitration Favors the Employer and
Disadvantages the Discriminated Against Employee, Going
Against the Purposes of Anti-Discrimination Legislation
The challenges that LGBTQ employees face—significant socioeconomic hardships, little bargaining power, and the lack of options
to avoid arbitration after having signed an MAA—are exacerbated
during the arbitration process, which overall hurts vulnerable employees.99 While arbitration certainly has time and cost benefits,
mandatory arbitration, especially in regard to discrimination
claims, has significant shortcomings that ultimately favor the employer and not the party alleging discrimination. Additionally, the
purpose of employment discrimination statutes, which is to
“achieve the public goal of eliminating discrimination in the workplace,”100 is not achieved through an arbitration process that disproportionately favors the employer.101 As such, litigation is a
see also Stacy A. Hickox & Michelle Kaminski, Measuring Arbitration’s Effectiveness in Addressing Workplace Harassment, 36 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J.
293, 301–02 (2019) (providing statistics showing that the EEOC can take on
very few claims and is overworked).
98. Glynn, supra note 97, at 1055. It is also possible that post-Bostock, the
EEOC may receive even more sex discrimination claims from LGBTQ employees as some of these employees are now empowered to make these claims after
the Supreme Court’s decision. See McCullough, supra note 29, at 2667–68
(showing an increase in sex discrimination claims by 13.6% to the EEOC the
year after the #MeToo movement took off in 2017).
99. See infra Part II.A.
100. Geraldine Szott Moohr, Arbitration and the Goals of Employment Discrimination Law, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 395, 399 (1999).
101. Employees also experience disadvantages in arbitration in a very tangible way: they win less in damages. See STONE & COLVIN, supra note 9, at 19–
20 (detailing a study showing that on average, employee plaintiffs’ overall
damages awarded in mandatory arbitration are $23,548 and the average overall damages for employment discrimination claims awarded in federal court
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more effective process for eliminating discrimination in the workplace because it deters employers from violating the law, educates
the public, and creates precedent for future discrimination cases.102
LGBTQ employees are prevented from meaningfully asserting
their post-Bostock rights when they are forced to arbitrate discrimination claims through a process that does not guarantee an extensive discovery process. Because arbitration is an informal process,
as compared to litigation, it often lacks the discovery tools that allow employees to access enough evidence for a viable claim. 103 Lack
of discovery is particularly difficult on employees bringing employment discrimination claims because proving these claims requires
evidence of disparate treatment, which in a post-Bostock claim
means an LGBTQ employee would have to show that an employee
who is of a different sex is being treated more favorably than they
are and that the LGBTQ employee’s membership in the protected
class is the reason for the unfavorable treatment.104 Because discrimination claims require evidence of disparate treatment, “it is
practically impossible to win without the right to use extensive discovery to find out how others have been treated.”105 Further, since
the employer sets the terms of the MAA,106 it will often impose provisions that “shorten statutes of limitations, alter the burdens of
proof, limit the amount of time a party has to present his or her
case, or otherwise impose constrictive procedural rules.”107 Because the discovery process is imperative to obtain sufficient evidence in a discrimination claim to show disparate treatment, litigation is needed to allow the employee the time and ability to carry
out full discovery in order to build the evidence for a viable claim.

are $143,497. Id. at 20. In terms of win rates, the employee win rate in arbitration is nearly 36% lower than the employee win rate in federal court). See
id.
102. See generally Szott Moohr, supra note 100, at 426–39.
103. Odessky, supra note 10.
104. Jennifer Isaacs, Proving Title VII Discrimination in 2019, AM. BAR
ASS’N,
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/young_lawyers/projects/no-limits/proving-title-vii-discrimination-in-2019/
[https://perma.cc/ZU58-Q6K5]
(last visited Oct. 5, 2021).
105. STONE & COLVIN, supra note 9, at 4.
106. See id.
107. Id.
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Additionally, while privacy is cited as an advantage of arbitration, it arguably undercuts the policy goals of anti-discrimination
statutes by funneling discrimination claims into private forums,
away from the public eye. Unlike arbitration, civil litigation can
deter employers who engage in serial discrimination by drawing attention to their misconduct; it also builds a public record of employer misconduct, allowing employees to access such information
and more easily assist in identifying repeat patterns of discriminatory conduct.108 Further, litigating discrimination claims would
help set favorable precedent, “produc[ing] published opinions that
courts [would] infuse into public law.”109 Since LGBTQ sex discrimination claims are “new” in the sense that there was only a patchwork of state workplace protections before, litigation is needed to
establish precedent in this area. Not only does the private nature
of arbitration hurt employees in being able to establish patterns of
conduct and reliable precedent,110 but discrimination claims specifically require a level of publicity to address policy concerns. Discrimination claims are fundamentally different from other disputes
because:
[P]rivacy causes greater concern when the subjects handled
in arbitration affect public interests. That is, we care more
when federal statutory claims such as employment discrimination are taken away from the public eye than when
a dispute over the quality of soybeans shipped from Missouri to Nevada is handled privately.111

108. Laurie Kratky Doré, Public Courts Versus Private Justice: It’s Time to
Let Some Sun Shine in on Alternative Dispute Resolution, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
463, 487–88 (2006) (“The confidentiality of the arbitral forum prevents other
similarly situated claimants from learning of the existence or substance of a
dispute. Arbitral privacy can thus deprive existing and potential claimants in
litigation or arbitration of information and documents relevant to their claims,
and it can impede them from proving a pattern or practice or intentional misconduct.”).
109. Schmitz, supra note 82, at 1211.
110. Levinson, supra note 65, at 495 (“While arbitration often results in a
private award, litigation of discrimination claims develops and refines legal
precedent and educates the public about the legality of certain employment
practices. This developed law not only governs future disputes, but also provides employers with guidelines for appropriate conduct and reinforces cultural norms that disavow invidious discrimination.”).
111. Sternlight, supra note 45, at 1664–65.
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Accordingly, the risks associated with the private arbitration of
anti-discrimination claims are far greater than when, for example,
commercial disputes are arbitrated.
In addition to privacy and discovery concerns, the fairness and
impartiality of the arbitration process is called into question by the
lack of diversity in the arbitration profession. Typically, arbitrators
are former lawyers or judges, a pool that generally tends to be white
males.112 Just 26% of members of the prestigious American Arbitration Association are “women and minorities,” and the Association does not even provide data regarding race or LGBTQ status of
its arbitrators.113 Further, because of issues such as the repeat
player advantage,114 which shows that employers win more in arbitration because of the incentive of the arbitrator to rule in favor
of the party who hired them,115 employers may intentionally avoid
certain arbitrators or request from the arbitration organization a
list of arbitrators with certain qualities such as experience as a
judge or law firm partner, which are positions typically held by
white men.116 LGBTQ employees may be hesitant to bring a claim,
112. Paige Smith, Lack of Arbitrator Diversity is an Issue of Supply and
Demand, BLOOMBERG L. (May 15, 2019, 6:04 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-labor-report/lack-of-arbitrator-diversity-is-an-issue-of-supplyand-demand [https://perma.cc/EBV4-HHTS].
113. Diversity
and
Inclusion
Initiatives,
AM.
ARB.
ASS’N,
https://www.adr.org/diversityinitiatives [https://perma.cc/6N24-DF7J] (last
visited Sep. 9, 2021).
114. “Repeat player advantage” refers to the phenomenon wherein employers win more in arbitration because it is the employer who is essentially hiring
the arbitrator, and as such, arbitrators are incentivized to rule in favor of the
employer, a potential repeat customer, in order to increase their chances of
being chosen to arbitrate for that organization again in the future. See STONE
& COLVIN, supra note 9, at 20–23 (detailing a study of 2,802 mandatory employment arbitration cases decided between 2003 and 2014). This study
showed that when an employer appears before an arbitrator the first time, the
employee’s chance of winning that case is 17.9%, which is still less than federal
and state court win rates. Id. at 23. But, after the employer has appeared
before the same arbitrator four times, the employee’s chance of winning drops
to 15.3%, and after an employer appears before the same arbitrator twentyfive times, the employee’s chance of winning is just 4.5%. Id.
115. Id.
116. Smith, supra note 112. Because of the overall lack of diversity in the
arbitration profession and requests by the employer of certain qualifications of
arbitrators from the arbitration organization, the process of selecting an arbitrator “more often than not results in the selection of a white, male mediator.”
Id.
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or view arbitration as fair, if they are not likely to see themselves
reflected in the process, or if they feel as though they may face discrimination from the arbitrator.117 Studies have shown that
LGBTQ individuals are hesitant to engage in services such as
healthcare due to fear of discrimination, lack of diversity, and absence of LGBTQ specific training in the medical profession.118 The
lack of diversity in the arbitration field, and any field providing services to a diverse group of people boils down to trust. When it comes
to addressing issues such as sex discrimination allegations, “it is
important that parties feel that they can trust the neutral third
party conducting their [arbitration] process, especially since many
[arbitration] processes bring participants together behind closed
doors and the discussions involve matters of crucial importance to
the livelihood or identity of the parties involved.”119
In addition, because LGBTQ employee protections varied so
widely prior to Bostock, it is reasonable to surmise that a
transgender employee in Alabama,120 where there were no protections for LGBTQ employees prior to Bostock, may be hesitant to
bring a post Bostock sex discrimination claim against their employer in mandatory arbitration if the arbitrator (typically familiar
with the employer) will likely be a white male who may have no
prior experience arbitrating LGBTQ sex discrimination claims.
This lack of diversity among arbitrators and the lack of experience
in arbitrating Bostock sex discrimination claims, could further discourage vulnerable LGBTQ employees from pursuing discrimination claims if they know their only option for a “neutral” fact finder
117. See Sopan Deb, Jay-Z Criticizes Lack of Black Arbitrators in a Battle
Over a Logo, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 28, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/28/arts/music/jay-z-roc-nation-arbitrators.html [perma.cc/
52P7-K6V4]. Rapper Jay-Z halted arbitration over a dispute with his clothing
line after he was only able to find two qualified Black arbitrators out of a list
of 100 provided by the American Arbitration Association. Id. Jay-Z’s lawyer
said this lack of diversity, “deprives litigants of color of a meaningful opportunity to have their claims heard by a panel of arbitrators reflecting their backgrounds and life experience.” Id.
118. RYAN THORESON, HUM. RTS. WATCH, “YOU DON’T WANT SECOND BEST”:
ANTI-LGBT DISCRIMINATION IN US HEALTH CARE 13–14, 21, 25, 26 (Graeme
Reid et al. eds., 2018).
119. Maria R. Volpe et al., Barriers to Participation: Challenges Faced by
Members of Underrepresented Racial and Ethnic Groups in Entering, Remaining, and Advancing the ADR Field, 35 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 119, 121 (2008).
120. See Loerch, supra note 14, app. at 172.
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is an arbitrator hired by their employer who will likely not reflect
the background of the employee.
In summary, mandatory arbitration creates the upper hand for
the employer by removing procedural safeguards such as discovery,121 as well as imposing privacy restrictions that prevent establishing precedent122 and identifying repeat discriminatory behavior
by the employer.123 These advantages to the employer contradict
the remedial and preventative goals of anti-discrimination legislation like Title VII in eliminating discrimination in the workplace.124
Further, the lack of diversity in the arbitration profession125 creates a lack of trust in the arbitrator and arbitration process when
minority employees, such as LGBTQ employees, do not see themselves reflected in the arbitrators that decide their claims. Due to
the advantages mandatory arbitration gives to the employer to the
detriment of the employee, this practice, especially in regard to arbitrating discrimination claims, needs to be eliminated.
III. THE FAA NEEDS TO BE AMENDED TO EXEMPT SEX DISCRIMINATION
CLAIMS, AND THE TIME IS NOW TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF POLITICAL AND
SOCIAL SUPPORT

As previously discussed, the Supreme Court has continued to
broadly interpret the FAA as enforcing arbitration agreements in
the employment context,126 and as largely preempting state laws
regarding arbitration.127 However, even Justice Gorsuch in Epic
Systems expressed concern regarding consequences of rigid adherence to a law enacted nearly a hundred years ago saying, “[y]ou
121. See Odessky, supra note 10.
122. Levinson, supra note 65, at 495.
123. Kratky Doré, supra note 108, at 487–88.
124. Szott Moohr, supra note 100, at 399.
125. Smith, supra note 112.
126. See supra Part I.
127. See id. See generally McCullough, supra note 29, at 2667–83 (detailing
the likely preemption of state legislation in 2017–2018 in Washington, New
York, California, and Massachusetts seeking to limit the scope of the FAA
through various approaches); Erin Mulvaney, Federal Arbitration Law Poses
Barrier to #MeToo State Laws, BLOOMBERG LAW (Aug. 7, 2019, 11:48 AM),
https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-labor-report/federal-arbitration-lawposes-barrier-to-metoo-era-state-laws [https://perma.cc/G63L-NGPB] (“Absent
a federal law change, arbitration is likely to prevail in court, despite states
jumping in to help. . . .”).
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might wonder if the balance Congress struck in 1925 between arbitration and litigation should be revisited in light of more contemporary developments.”128 The Supreme Court, however, constrained
by decades of precedent favoring arbitration, is not the forum where
change addressing the contemporary issues created by the application of the FAA can be made. As Ruth Bader Ginsburg stated in
her dissent in Epic Systems, “[c]ongressional correction of the
Court’s elevation of the FAA over workers’ rights . . . is urgently in
order.”129 Accordingly, Congress is the only entity able to loosen
the decades-long grip the FAA has imposed on some of America’s
most vulnerable workers.130
Similar to LGBTQ employees, members of other Title VII protected classes131 also experience socioeconomic hardships that affect bargaining power in the employment context as well as face
practical and procedural disadvantages in the arbitration forum.132
As such, ideally, all Title VII discrimination claims would be exempt from MAAs in order to prevent employers from contracting
around Title VII protections, to better serve the purposes of antidiscrimination legislation, and to put vulnerable employees on
more equal footing with their employer when claims arise.133 However, this broader approach to amending the FAA was attempted
most recently in 2019134 with the Forced Arbitration Injustice Repeal (FAIR) Act. The FAIR Act attempted to amend the FAA to

128. Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1621–22 (2018).
129. Id. at 1633 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
130. See id.
131. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (“[R]ace, color, religion, sex, or national origin
. . . .”).
132. See supra Part II.
133. Freeman Peshehonoff, supra note 57, at 516 (“Title VII claims, as a
whole, should not be subject to arbitration provisions. Such claims should be
treated as they were under the Alexander rationale—separate. An exemption
that prevents employers from contracting around Title VII protections would
once again protect employees from harassment and discrimination and shine
a light on the companies that perpetuate discriminatory behavior. Without
this change, companies will continue to hide misconduct and employees will
continue to suffer behind closed doors.”).
134. Similar laws have been proposed in the past and also have received
little support due to the broad nature of the amendment. See The Arbitration
Fairness Act of 2007: Hearing on S. 1782 Before the Subcomm. on the Const. of
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 3 (2007) (statement of Sam Brownback, Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary).
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“prohibit predispute arbitration agreements that force arbitration
of future employment, consumer, antitrust, or civil rights [Title VII]
disputes . . . .”135 While this sweeping legislation passed in the
Democrat-controlled House of Representatives,136 the bill did not
even come up for debate on the Senate floor because of its broad
approach and lack of bipartisan support.137 Therefore, a more limited amendment to the FAA has a better chance of coming to fruition. Because LGBTQ discrimination claims are sex discrimination
claims under Bostock, LGBTQ employees have a unique opportunity to capitalize on current political and social support to push
for a narrow amendment to the FAA that would exempt only sex
discrimination claims from mandatory arbitration.
Amending the FAA to exempt sex discrimination claims has
had bipartisan political support in the past,138 but bolstered by current Democratic majorities in the House and Senate, as well as
Democratic control of the presidency, the time to seize on political
support to amend the FAA is now.139 The Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Harassment Act (EFASHA),140 originally introduced
by Senator Kirsten Gillibrand in 2017, provides the necessary language: “[N]o predispute arbitration agreement shall be valid or

135. See Forced Arbitration Injustice Repeal Act, H.R. 1423, 116th Cong. §
2(1) (2019).
136. Alexia Fernandez Campbell, The House just passed a bill that would
give millions of workers the right to sue their boss, VOX (Sep. 20, 2019, 11:30
AM), https://www.vox.com/identities/2019/9/20/20872195/forced-mandatoryarbitration-bill-fair-act [https://perma.cc/P9MA-XZ4S].
137. Id.
138. McCullough, supra note 29, at 2675 (“House and Senate sponsorship
for [EFASHA] did not follow strict party lines, indicating stronger bipartisan
support”).
139. Congress Profiles, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, https://history.house.gov/Congressional-Overview/Profiles/111th/ [https://perma.cc/
E84T-CVR4] (last visited Sep. 11, 2021) (the last time Democrats controlled
the House, Senate, and Presidency was 2009–2011); Jacob Jarvis, Democrats
Set Sights on Holding Congress in 2022 as Fundraising Push Launched,
NEWSWEEK (Jan. 28, 2021, 8:30 AM), https://www.newsweek.com/democratsset-sights-holding-congress-2022-fundraising-push-launched-1565097 [https://
perma.cc/4JN3-8UUL] (the loss of even one Democratic seat in the 2022 election would erase Democratic control in the Senate and perhaps take away the
opportunity to pass EFASHA).
140. Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Harassment Act, S. 2203, 115th
Cong. (2017).
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enforceable if it requires arbitration of a sex discrimination dispute.”141 The EFASHA further defines “sex discrimination dispute”
to mean “a dispute between an employer and employee arising out
of conduct that would form the basis of a claim based on sex under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 . . . .”142
This bill garnered a fair amount of bipartisan support, including Republican Senator Lindsey Graham.143 However, the effort
floundered because it lacked support from the White House and
likely drew subtle pushback from the business community, although “business leaders were hesitant to publicly denounce [the
bill] for fear of criticism that they were silencing victims of sexual
harassment.”144 However, currently, with Democratic control of
the Legislative and Executive branches of government, the
EFASHA could come to fruition. Additionally, with the narrow
scope of an FAA amendment, like the EFASHA, bipartisan145 support is more likely and would fend off procedural hurdles and legislative non-starters such as the dreaded Senate filibuster,146 which
stands as an impediment to broader legislation, such as the FAIR
Act.
Further bolstering the chances of passing narrow legislation
exempting sex discrimination claims from the FAA is the growing

141. Id. at § 402(a).
142. Id. at § 401(2).
143. S. 2342 (IS) - Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual
Harassment Act of 2021, GOVINFO, https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/
BILLS-117s2342is [https://perma.cc/3J77-234P] (last visited Oct. 5, 2021).
144. McCullough, supra note 29, at 2677.
145. Erik Encarnacion, Discrimination, Mandatory Arbitration, and
Courts, 108 GEO. L.J. 855, 903 (2020) (“More recent bills [EFASHA] are far
more likely to gain traction due to their bipartisan support and, not unrelatedly, their narrower scope . . . . To the extent that existing bipartisanship can
be leveraged to reform the FAA, this piecemeal legislative reform looks more
promising in the near term . . . .”).
146. See Astead W. Herndon & Lisa Lerer, Biden Won’t Budge on the Senate
Filibuster. Why Aren’t Progressives Pushing Him?, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 27, 2021,
6:28 PM), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/27/us/politics/biden-filibuster.
html [https://perma.cc/WA7C-BALV] (“[T]he [Senate’s] sixty-vote threshold
that has for years stymied expansive legislation . . . .”). See generally Alex Tausanovitch and Sam Berger, The Impact of the Federal Filibuster on Policymaking, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Dec. 5, 2019, 9:02 AM), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/democracy/reports/2019/12/05/478199/impact-filibusterfederal-policymaking/ [https://perma.cc/AAN4-SK77].
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social support from movements like #MeToo and Time’s Up.147
LGBTQ employees share many of the concerns addressed by these
movements, including the conviction that mandatory arbitration
protects perpetrators of sexual harassment and leaves victims with
no recourse aside from stifling arbitration procedures.148 The pressure from these social movements in creating awareness, support,
and change around the injustices that result from the mandatory
arbitration of sex discrimination claims is evidenced by corporate
responses to the movement.149 In just the past several years150 corporate giants like Google, Lyft, Uber, Facebook, and Airbnb have
all, in varying forms, waived mandatory arbitration for employees
bringing sexual harassment and/or discrimination claims.151 Notably, when the EFASHA was introduced in 2017, Microsoft became
the first Fortune 100 company to publicly endorse the proposed legislation.152 All this to say, in addition to the political support previously discussed, current social movements provide LGBTQ employees with an array of allies who can help push for a narrow
amendment exempting sex discrimination claims from the FAA. By
capitalizing on this unique political and social climate, LGBTQ employees are ensured that Bostock Title VII sex discrimination protections are not thwarted by MAAs.

147. See Alix Langone, #MeToo and Time’s Up Founders Explain the Difference Between the 2 Movements and How They’re Alike, TIME (Mar. 22, 2018,
5:21 PM), http://time.com/5189945/whats-the-difference-between-the-metooand-times-up-movements/ [https://perma.cc/YF49-XYHN].
148. See supra Part II; Gretchen Carlson, Gretchen Carlson: The Supreme
Court Tried to End #MeToo. Here’s How We’re Fighting Back., FORTUNE (May
31, 2018, 11:06 AM), http://fortune.com/2018/05/31/gretchen-carlson-supremecourt-ruling-arbitration-metoo/ [https://perma.cc/5WXE-R4FT] (“Forced arbitration is a sexual harasser’s best friend: It keeps proceedings secret, findings
sealed, and victims silent.”).
149. See McCullough, supra note 29, at 2683–85.
150. Id. at 2683–84 (most of these corporate measures were introduced in
2018, after the EFASHA was unsuccessful in 2017).
151. Id.
152. Id. at 2683; Brad Smith, Microsoft Endorses Senate Bill to Address Sexual Harassment, MICROSOFT: ON THE ISSUES (Dec. 19, 2017), https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2017/12/19/microsoft-endorses-senate-bill-addresssexual-harassment/ [https://perma.cc/ND4X-NZV4].
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CONCLUSION

On June 15, 2020, Bostock provided hope to many LGBTQ employees across America because the law would protect them from
discrimination in the workplace.153 But the FAA diminishes these
protections for LGBTQ employees by allowing the employer,
through MAAs, to determine the ultimate recourse, if any, the employee will receive as a result of alleged employer sex discrimination. LGBTQ employees face socioeconomic disadvantages that
leave them with little bargaining power and government agencies
struggle to have the capacity and resources to assist discriminated
against employees from navigating MAAs. Additionally, MAAs do
not achieve the remedial or preventative goals of anti-discrimination legislation because MAAs favor the employer and provide the
employee with no way to access justice through the public process
of litigation. While ideally all Title VII claims would be exempt
from arbitration, LGBTQ employees have a unique opportunity to
seize on current political support and the efforts of social movements to push for a narrow amendment to the seemingly all-powerful FAA that would exempt sex discrimination claims from mandatory arbitration. This amendment is a necessary step to provide
LGBTQ employees the ability to litigate their discrimination claims
and enforce their hard-fought rights under Bostock to the full extent.

153. See Jamieson & Reinstein, supra note 3.

